

The asymptotic value in finite stochastic games

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Abstract

We provide a direct, elementary proof for the existence of $\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} v_\lambda$, where v_λ is the value of λ -discounted finite two-person zero-sum stochastic game.

1 Introduction

Two-person zero-sum stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [4]. They are described by a 5-tuple $(\Omega, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{J}, q, g)$, where Ω is a finite set of states, \mathcal{I} and \mathcal{J} are finite sets of actions, $g : \Omega \times \mathcal{I} \times \mathcal{J} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is the payoff, $q : \Omega \times \mathcal{I} \times \mathcal{J} \rightarrow \Delta(\Omega)$ the transition and, for any finite set X , $\Delta(X)$ denotes the set of probability distributions over X . The functions g and q are bilinearly extended to $\Omega \times \Delta(\mathcal{I}) \times \Delta(\mathcal{J})$. The stochastic game with initial state $\omega \in \Omega$ and discount factor $\lambda \in (0, 1]$ is denoted by $\Gamma_\lambda(\omega)$ and is played as follows: at stage $m \geq 1$, knowing the current state ω_m , the players choose actions $(i_m, j_m) \in \mathcal{I} \times \mathcal{J}$; their choice produces a stage payoff $g(\omega_m, i_m, j_m)$ and influences the transition: a new state ω_{m+1} is chosen according to the probability distribution $q(\cdot | \omega_m, i_m, j_m)$. At the end of the game, player 1 receives $\sum_{m \geq 1} \lambda(1 - \lambda)^{m-1} g(\omega_m, i_m, j_m)$ from player 2. The game $\Gamma_\lambda(\omega)$ has a value $v_\lambda(\omega)$, and $v_\lambda = (v_\lambda(\omega))_{\omega \in \Omega}$ is the unique fixed point of the so-called Shapley operator [4], i.e. $v_\lambda = \Phi(\lambda, v_\lambda)$, where for all $f \in \mathbb{R}^\Omega$:

$$\Phi(\lambda, f)(\omega) = \text{val}_{(s,t) \in \Delta(\mathcal{I}) \times \Delta(\mathcal{J})} \{ \lambda g(\omega, s, t) + (1 - \lambda) \mathbb{E}_{q(\cdot | \omega, s, t)} [f(\tilde{\omega})] \}. \quad (1.1)$$

The Shapley operator provides optimal stationary strategies for both players. In particular, the result holds for any signalling structure on past actions. The existence of $\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} v_\lambda$ was established by Bewley and Kohlberg [1], using Tarski-Seidenberg elimination theorem.

The purpose of this note is to provide a direct, self-contained proof for the existence of $\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} v_\lambda$. The key idea is to represent the asymptotic behaviour of a sequence of strategies by a simpler object. Let $(x, y) \in \Delta(\mathcal{I})^\Omega \times \Delta(\mathcal{J})^\Omega$

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be a pair of stationary strategies. Every time the state $\omega \in \Omega$ is reached the next state is distributed according to $q(\cdot|\omega, x(\omega), y(\omega))$ and the stage payoff is $g(\omega, x(\omega), y(\omega))$. Thus, the sequence of states $(\omega_m)_m$ is a Markov chain with transition $Q = (q(\omega'|\omega, x(\omega), y(\omega)))_{(\omega, \omega') \in \Omega^2}$ and the stage payoffs can be described by a vector $g = (g(\omega, x(\omega), y(\omega)))_{\omega \in \Omega}$. For any initial state ω , the expected payoff induced by (x, y) in $\Gamma_\lambda(\omega)$ is given by

$$\gamma_\lambda(\omega, x, y) = \sum_{\omega' \in \Omega} t_\lambda(\omega, \omega') g(\omega'),$$

where $t_\lambda(\omega, \omega') = \sum_{m \geq 1} \lambda(1 - \lambda)^{m-1} Q^{m-1}(\omega, \omega')$ is the mean λ -discounted time spent in state ω' .

A key observation, due to Solan [5], is that $t_\lambda(\omega, \omega')$ can be written as a hitting time of an auxiliary Markov chain whose transitions are in the set $\{0, \lambda, ((1 - \lambda)Q(\omega, \omega'))_{(\omega, \omega') \in \Omega^2}\}$. Thus, using a classical result from Friedlin and Wentzell for finite Markov chains, one deduces that $t_\lambda(\omega, \omega')$ is a rational fraction in the variables λ and $((1 - \lambda)Q(\omega, \omega'))_{(\omega, \omega') \in \Omega^2}$, and that both polynomials in the numerator and denominator have nonnegative coefficients and are of degree at most $|\Omega|$. For a fixed y , a similar assertion is obtained for $\gamma_\lambda(\omega, x, y)$ as a function of the variables λ and $((1 - \lambda)x^i(\omega))_{(\omega, i) \in \Omega \times \mathcal{I}}$. That is, $\gamma_\lambda(\omega, x, y)$ is a rational fraction in these variables. One can easily check that the monomials both in the numerator and denominator can then be written in the following form:

$$C(1 - \lambda)^b \lambda^a \prod_{(\omega, i) \in \Omega \times \mathcal{I}} x^i(\omega)^{A(\omega, i)}, \quad (1.2)$$

where $C > 0$ depends on (y, ω) but not on (x, λ) , $a, b \in \{0, \dots, |\Omega|\}$ and $A \in \{0, 1\}^{\Omega \times \mathcal{I}}$.

1.1 The asymptotic payoff

Consider now a sequence $(\lambda_n, x_n)_n$, where $\lambda_n \in (0, 1]$ is a discount factor and $x_n \in \Delta(\mathcal{I})^\Omega$ is a stationary strategy, for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. $\gamma_{\lambda_n}(\omega, x_n, y)$, as n tends to infinity, for a fixed stationary strategy $y \in \Delta(\mathcal{J})^\Omega$.

Definition 1.1. A sequence $(\lambda_n, x_n)_n$ in $(0, 1] \times \Delta(\mathcal{I})^\Omega$ is regular if $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \lambda_n = 0$ and if for any two monomials of the form (1.2) their ratio converges in $[0, +\infty]$ as n tends to infinity.¹

Regular sequences can be characterized by a vector. Indeed, introduce a finite set:

$$\mathcal{M} := \{(A, a) \mid A \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^{\Omega \times \mathcal{I}}, a \in \{-|\Omega|, \dots, 0, \dots, |\Omega|\}\}.$$

The sequence $(\lambda_n, x_n)_n$ is regular if for all $(A, a) \in \mathcal{M}$ the following limit

$$L[(\lambda_n, x_n)_n](A, a) := \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \lambda_n^a \prod_{(\omega, i) \in \Omega \times \mathcal{I}} x_n^i(\omega)^{A(\omega, i)} \quad (1.3)$$

exists in $[0, +\infty]$. The regularity of a sequence depends on the existence of finitely many limits. Thus, for any family $(x_\lambda)_{\lambda \in (0, 1]}$ of stationary strategies there exists $(\lambda_n)_n$ such that $(\lambda_n, x_{\lambda_n})_n$ is regular.

¹We use here the natural convention that $\frac{0}{0} = 0^0 = 1$ and $0^\beta = 0$, $0^{-\beta} = \frac{\beta}{0} = +\infty$, for all $\beta > 0$.

Proposition 1.1. *Let $y \in \Delta(\mathcal{J})^\Omega$ and $\omega \in \Omega$ be fixed. For any regular sequence $(\lambda_n, x_n)_n$, $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \gamma_{\lambda_n}(\omega, x_n, y)$ exists and depends only on the vector $L[(\lambda_n, x_n)_n]$.*

Proof. Let $(\lambda_n, x_n)_n$ be regular and let $L = L[(\lambda_n, x_n)_n]$. We have already seen that the expected payoff induced by (x_n, y) in $\Gamma_{\lambda_n}(\omega)$ can be written as a rational fraction whose monomials are all of the form:

$$m_n := C(1 - \lambda_n)^b \lambda_n^a \prod_{(\omega, i) \in \Omega \times \mathcal{I}} x_n^i(\omega)^{A(\omega, i)}, \quad (1.4)$$

that the ratio of any two monomials m_n and m'_n converges as $n \rightarrow \infty$, and that the limit is determined by L (and the constants $C, C' > 0$). Thus, one can use the vector L to define an order relation in the set of the monomials in $\gamma_{\lambda_n}(\omega, x_n, y)$ as follows: $m_n \preceq m'_n$ if and only if $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} m_n/m'_n \in [0, +\infty)$. The set is totally ordered. Dividing numerator and denominator by some maximal element m_n^* , and taking $n \rightarrow \infty$ we obtain that:

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \gamma_{\lambda_n}(\omega, x_n, y) = \frac{\sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{M}^+} C(A, a) L(A - A^*, a - a^*)}{\sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{M}^+} C'(A, a) L(A - A^*, a - a^*)}, \quad (1.5)$$

where $\mathcal{M}^+ := \{(A, a) \mid A \in \{0, 1\}^{\Omega \times \mathcal{I}}, a \in \{0, \dots, |\Omega|\}\}$, and where the constants $C(A, a)$ and $C'(A, a)$ are nonnegative for all $(A, a) \in \mathcal{M}^+$. The maximality of m^* ensures that $L(A - A^*, a - a^*) \in [0, +\infty)$, for all $(A, a) \in \mathcal{M}^+$ and that not all are 0. The result follows. \square

1.2 Canonical strategies

For any $\mathbf{c} = (\mathbf{c}(\omega, i))$ and $\mathbf{e} = (\mathbf{e}(\omega, i))$ in $\mathbb{R}_+^{\Omega \times \mathcal{I}}$, we define a family of stationary strategies $(\mathbf{x}_\lambda)_\lambda$ as follows:

$$\mathbf{x}_\lambda^i(\omega) := \frac{\mathbf{c}(\omega, i) \lambda^{\mathbf{e}(\omega, i)}}{\sum_{i' \in \mathcal{I}} \mathbf{c}(\omega, i') \lambda^{\mathbf{e}(\omega, i')}}, \quad \forall (\omega, i) \in \Omega \times \mathcal{I}, \quad \forall \lambda \in (0, 1]. \quad (1.6)$$

Assume, in addition, that $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \mathbf{e}(\omega, i) = 1$ for all ω , so that

$$\mathbf{x}_\lambda^i(\omega) \sim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} \mathbf{c}(\omega, i) \lambda^{\mathbf{e}(\omega, i)}, \quad \forall (\omega, i) \in \Omega \times \mathcal{I}. \quad (1.7)$$

The exponent determines the order of magnitude of the probability of playing the action i at state ω asymptotically; the coefficient $\mathbf{c}(\omega, i)$ its intensity.

Definition 1.2. *A family of strategies $(\mathbf{x}_\lambda)_{\lambda \in (0, 1]}$ is canonical if it is induced by some $\mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{e})$ in the following set:*

$$\mathbf{X} = \{(\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{e}) \in (\mathbb{R}_+^* \times \mathbb{R}_+)^{\Omega \times \mathcal{I}} \mid \forall \omega \in \Omega, \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \mathbf{e}(\omega, i) = 1\}.$$

Note that the coefficients are taken strictly positive.

For all $(A, a) \in \mathcal{M}$ and $\mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{e}) \in \mathbf{X}$ the following limit exists:

$$L_{\mathbf{x}}(A, a) := \lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} \lambda^a \prod_{(\omega, i)} \mathbf{x}_\lambda^i(\omega)^{A(\omega, i)}. \quad (1.8)$$

Indeed, a direct consequence of (1.7) is that:

$$L_{\mathbf{x}}(A, a) = \lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} \lambda^{a + \sum_{(\omega, i)} A(\omega, i) \mathbf{e}(\omega, i)} \prod_{(\omega, i)} \mathbf{c}(\omega, i)^{A(\omega, i)},$$

where $\prod_{(\omega, i)} \mathbf{c}(\omega, i)^{A(\omega, i)} > 0$. Thus:

$$L_{\mathbf{x}}(A, a) \in \begin{cases} \{0\}, & \text{iff } a + \sum_{(\omega, i)} A(\omega, i) \mathbf{e}(\omega, i) > 0, \\ \{+\infty\}, & \text{iff } a + \sum_{(\omega, i)} A(\omega, i) \mathbf{e}(\omega, i) < 0, \\ (0, +\infty), & \text{iff } a + \sum_{(\omega, i)} A(\omega, i) \mathbf{e}(\omega, i) = 0. \end{cases} \quad (1.9)$$

Thus, for any $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{X}$ and any vanishing sequence $(\lambda_n)_n$ of discount factors, the sequence $(\lambda_n, \mathbf{x}_{\lambda_n})_n$ is regular. Moreover, $L_{\mathbf{x}} = L[(\lambda_n, \mathbf{x}_{\lambda_n})_n]$ for any such sequence.

2 Main results

2.1 Representation of a regular sequence by a canonical strategy

Fix some regular sequence $(\lambda_n, x_n)_n$ throughout this section and let $L = L[(\lambda_n, x_n)_n] \in [0, +\infty]^{\mathcal{M}}$ the vector defined in (1.3). Notice that L has many elementary properties:

- (P1) $L(0, 0) = 1$ and, for all $(A, a) \neq 0$, $L(A, a) = +\infty$ if and only if $L(-A, -a) = 0$;
- (P2) For all $\mu \in \mathbb{R}$, $L(0, \mu) := \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \lambda_n^\mu = 0 \Leftrightarrow \mu > 0$ and $L(0, \mu) \in (0, +\infty) \Leftrightarrow \mu = 0$. In particular, $L(0, \mu) \in \{0, 1, +\infty\}$ for all $\mu \in \mathbb{R}$;
- (P3) If $L(A, a) < +\infty$, $L(\mu A, \mu a) := \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \lambda_n^{\mu a} \prod_{(\omega, i)} x_n^i(\omega)^{\mu A(\omega, i)} = L(A, a)^\mu$;
- (P4) If $L(A, a) < +\infty$ and $L(B, b) < +\infty$, then $L(A + B, a + b) = L(A, a)L(B, b)$.

Proposition 2.1. *There exists $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{X}$ such that $L_{\mathbf{x}} = L$.*

Proof. Note that $\prod_{(\omega, i)} \mathbf{c}(\omega, i)^{A(\omega, i)} > 0$ for any $A \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^{\Omega \times I}$. Thus, from (1.9) and (P1) one deduces the following necessary and sufficient conditions on the coefficients and the exponents (\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{e}) of \mathbf{x} for having $L_{\mathbf{x}} = L$:

$$\sum_{(\omega, i)} A(\omega, i) \mathbf{e}(\omega, i) + a > 0, \quad \forall (A, a) \in \mathcal{M} \text{ s.t. } L(A, a) = 0, \quad (2.1)$$

$$\sum_{(\omega, i)} A(\omega, i) \mathbf{e}(\omega, i) + a = 0, \quad \forall (A, a) \in \mathcal{M} \text{ s.t. } L(A, a) \in (0, +\infty), \quad (2.2)$$

$$\prod_{(\omega, i)} \mathbf{c}(\omega, i)^{A(\omega, i)} = L(A, a), \quad \forall (A, a) \in \mathcal{M} \text{ s.t. } L(A, a) \in (0, +\infty). \quad (2.3)$$

Notation: Let $\mathcal{L}_0 := \{(A, a) \in \mathcal{M} \mid L(A, a) = 0\}$ and $\mathcal{L}_+ := \{(A, a) \in \mathcal{M} \mid L(A, a) \in (0, +\infty)\}$. Put $\mathcal{L} := \mathcal{L}_0 \cup \mathcal{L}_+$.

Solving for the exponents. Let us prove that the system (2.1)-(2.2) has a solution. One and only one of the systems (2.1)-(2.2) and (2.4)-(2.5)-(2.6) is consistent (see Mertens, Sorin and Zamir [3], part A, page 28):

$$\sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}} \mu(A, a) A = 0, \quad \mu|_{\mathcal{L}_0} \geq 0, \quad (2.4)$$

$$- \sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}} \mu(A, a) a \geq 0, \quad (2.5)$$

$$- \sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}} \mu(A, a) a + \sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_0} \mu(A, a) > 0, \quad (2.6)$$

Let us prove that the system (2.4)-(2.5)-(2.6), with unknowns $\mu = (\mu(A, a))_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}} \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{L}}$, is inconsistent. In (2.4), $\mu|_{\mathcal{L}_0} := (\mu(A, a))_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_0}$ denotes the restriction of μ to \mathcal{L}_0 . Assume (2.4). On the one hand, by (P3)-(P4), for all $\mu \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{L}}$:

$$\prod_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_+} L(A, a)^{\mu(A, a)} = L \left(\sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_+} \mu(A, a) A, \sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_+} \mu(A, a) a \right) \in (0, +\infty) \quad (2.7)$$

On the other hand, by (P3)-(P4), for all $\mu \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $\mu|_{\mathcal{L}_0} \geq 0$ one has:

$$\prod_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_0} L(A, a)^{\mu(A, a)} = L \left(\sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_0} \mu(A, a) A, \sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_0} \mu(A, a) a \right) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mu|_{\mathcal{L}_0} = 0, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (2.8)$$

Multiplying (2.7) and (2.8) yields, by assumption (2.4) :

$$L \left(0, \sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}} \mu(A, a) a \right) \in \begin{cases} (0, +\infty) & \text{if } \mu|_{\mathcal{L}_0} = 0, \\ \{0\} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (2.9)$$

By (P2), the first case implies $\sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}} \mu(A, a) a = 0$, which contradicts (2.6), and the second case implies $\sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}} \mu(A, a) a > 0$, which contradicts (2.5). The system (2.4)-(2.5)-(2.6) being inconsistent, the existence of a solution to (2.1)-(2.2) in $\mathbb{R}^{\Omega \times \mathcal{I}}$ follows. The boundedness of $x_n(\omega, i)$ implies that $L((0, \dots, 1^{(\omega, i)}, \dots, 0), 0) < +\infty$, so that $\mathbf{e}(\omega, i) \geq 0$ by (2.1) and (2.2).

Solving for the coefficients. Taking the logarithm in (2.3) yields:

$$\sum_{(\omega, i)} A(\omega, i) \ln \mathbf{c}(\omega, i) = \ln(L(A, a)), \quad \forall (A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_+, \quad (2.10)$$

which is a linear system in $\mathbf{d} = (\ln \mathbf{c}(\omega, i))_{(\omega, i) \in \Omega \times \mathcal{I}} \in \mathbb{R}^{\Omega \times \mathcal{I}}$. As before, one and only one of the systems (2.10) and (2.11) is consistent:

$$\sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_+} \mu(A, a) A = 0, \quad \sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_+} \mu(A, a) \ln(L(A, a)) > 0. \quad (2.11)$$

Let us prove that the system (2.11), with unknowns $\mu = (\mu(A, a))_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_+} \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{L}_+}$, is inconsistent. Suppose that $\sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_+} \mu(A, a) A = 0$. Then, by (P3)-(P4):

$$\prod_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_+} L(A, a)^{\mu(A, a)} = L \left(0, \sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_+} \mu(A, a) a \right) \in (0, +\infty).$$

By (P2), this implies $\sum_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_+} \mu(A, a) a = 0$ and, a fortiori, $\prod_{(A, a) \in \mathcal{L}_+} L(A, a)^{\mu(A, a)} = 1$, so that (2.11) fails. Consequently, there exists $\mathbf{c} = (\exp(\mathbf{d}(\omega, i))) \in (\mathbb{R}_+^*)^{\Omega \times \mathcal{I}}$ satisfying (2.3). \square

2.2 Convergence of the discounted values

Theorem 2.1. *The limit of $(v_\lambda)_\lambda$, as λ tends to 0, exists. Moreover, there exists $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{X}$ such that $(\mathbf{x}_\lambda)_\lambda$ is asymptotically optimal, i.e. for all $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists $\lambda_0 \in (0, 1]$ such that:*

$$\gamma_\lambda(\omega, \mathbf{x}_\lambda, y) \geq \lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} v_\lambda(\omega) - \varepsilon, \quad \forall \omega \in \Omega, \quad \forall y \in \Delta(\mathcal{J})^\Omega, \quad \forall \lambda \in (0, \lambda_0).$$

Proof. Let $\omega \in \Omega$ be fixed. Let $(x_\lambda)_{\lambda>0}$ be a family of optimal stationary strategies in $(\Gamma_\lambda(\omega))_{\lambda>0}$ and let $(\lambda_n)_n$ be a sequence of discount factors such that $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} v_{\lambda_n}(\omega) = \limsup_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} v_\lambda(\omega)$. The optimality of x_{λ_n} implies that $\gamma_{\lambda_n}(\omega, x_{\lambda_n}, j) \geq v_{\lambda_n}(\omega)$, for all $j \in \mathcal{J}^\Omega$. Indeed, against a stationary strategy of player 1, player 2 faces a Markov decision process. Thus, player 2 has a pure stationary best reply. Up to some subsequence, $(\lambda_n, x_{\lambda_n})_n$ is regular. By Proposition 2.1, there exists $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{X}$ such that $L_{\mathbf{x}} = L[(\lambda_n, x_{\lambda_n})_n]$. Thus, by Proposition 1.1,

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \gamma_{\lambda_n}(\omega, x_{\lambda_n}, j) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \gamma_{\lambda_n}(\omega, \mathbf{x}_{\lambda_n}, j), \quad \forall j \in \mathcal{J}^\Omega.$$

On the other hand, the limit $\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} \gamma_\lambda(\omega, \mathbf{x}_\lambda, j)$ exists. Consequently:

$$\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} \gamma_\lambda(\omega, \mathbf{x}_\lambda, j) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \gamma_{\lambda_n}(\omega, x_{\lambda_n}, j) \geq \limsup_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} v_\lambda(\omega), \quad \forall j \in \mathcal{J}^\Omega. \quad (2.12)$$

It follows that for all $\varepsilon > 0$ there exists $\lambda_0 \in (0, 1]$ such that:

$$\min_{j \in \mathcal{J}^\Omega} \gamma_\lambda(\omega, \mathbf{x}_\lambda, j) \geq \limsup_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} v_\lambda(\omega) - \varepsilon, \quad \forall \lambda \in (0, \lambda_0). \quad (2.13)$$

The latter implies that $v_\lambda(\omega) \geq \limsup_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} v_\lambda(\omega) - \varepsilon$, for all $\lambda \in (0, \lambda_0)$, and the existence of $\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} v_\lambda$ follows by taking the \liminf . The canonical strategy \mathbf{x} has the desired property. \square

2.3 Concluding remarks

- (1) Consider an infinitely repeated stochastic game where the past actions are observed. The existence of the uniform value is due to Mertens and Neyman [2] and relies on the following result:

Theorem 2.2. *Let $f : (0, 1) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^\Omega$ be a function such that:*

- (a) $\|f_\lambda - f_{\lambda'}\| \leq \int_\lambda^{\lambda'} \varphi(x) dx$, for all $0 < \lambda < \lambda' < 1$ and for some $\varphi \in L^1((0, 1], \mathbb{R}_+)$;
- (b) *There exists $\lambda_0 > 0$ such that $\Phi(\lambda, f_\lambda) \geq f_\lambda$, for all $\lambda \in (0, \lambda_0)$.*²

Then, player 1 can guarantee $\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} f_\lambda$ in Γ_∞ .

One can use Theorem 2.1 to prove the existence of the uniform value. Indeed, for any $x \in \Delta(\mathcal{I})^\Omega$, $\omega \in \Omega$ and $\lambda \in (0, 1]$, let $w_\lambda^x(\omega) := \min_{j \in \mathcal{J}^\Omega} \gamma_\lambda(\omega, x, j)$ be the payoff guaranteed by x in $\Gamma_\lambda(\omega)$. One can check that $w_\lambda^x \leq \Phi(\lambda, w_\lambda^x)$, for all $\lambda \in (0, 1]$. Besides, for any $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{X}$, the functions $(\lambda \mapsto w_\lambda^{\mathbf{x}_\lambda}(\omega))_{\omega \in \Omega}$ are of bounded variation, so that player 1 can guarantee $\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} w_\lambda^{\mathbf{x}_\lambda}$ for any $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{X}$ by Theorem 2.2. In particular, if $(\mathbf{x}_\lambda)_\lambda$ is asymptotically optimal, player 1 can guarantee $\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow 0} v_\lambda$.

- (2) The existence of an $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{X}$ such that $(\mathbf{x}_\lambda)_\lambda$ is asymptotically optimal was already noticed by Solan and Vieille [6]. The result was deduced from the semi-algebraicity of $\lambda \mapsto v_\lambda$, obtained in [1] using Tarski-Seidenberg elimination theorem.

² Φ is the Shapley operator, defined in (1.1).

- (3) In the system (2.1)-(2.2) for the exponents (first part of the proof of Proposition 2.1) note that all the entries of A are in $\{-1, 0, 1\}$. This implies the existence of a solution having all its coordinates in $\{0, 1/N, 2/N, \dots\}$, for some $N \leq |\Omega||\mathcal{I}|\sqrt{|\Omega||\mathcal{I}|}$.
- (4) Our approach fails without the finiteness assumption on \mathcal{I} , \mathcal{J} and Ω . A recent example where \mathcal{I} and \mathcal{J} are compact, q is continuous, g is independent of the actions and the family $(v_\lambda)_\lambda$ does not converge is due to Vigeral [7].

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